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Non-Technical Summary
Reflecting distributional concerns, many countries apply VAT reductions to goods
which make up a larger share in the consumption of low-income households. This
paper addresses the question to what extent VAT differentiation can be rationalised
on distributional grounds.
We employ an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model to investigate distributional
effects and efficiency implications for structural VAT reforms based on empirically
data for Germany. In our numerical simulations we compare a pure VAT reform,
where the differentiated VAT is replaced with a uniform rate, and scenarios in which
the additional revenues are compensated with tax reductions involving the marginal
income tax rate (MITR), the income tax allowance (ITA) or the social security
contributions (SSC).
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: The abolition of the reduced VAT
rate in itself has only a small redistributive effect towards more inequality. Therefore,
VAT differentiation can hardly be considered as an effective means of redistribution
policy. When we compensate the abolition of reduced VAT rates with reductions
in the marginal income tax rate or cuts in social security contributions, there is
scope for significant gains in overall welfare. A budget compensation scheme based
on a reduction in the income tax allowance, however, produces welfare losses, due to
the implied increase in the marginal tax burden. Policy-induced changes in macro-
economic indicators like GDP, employment, domestic capital use, or aggregate con-
sumption echo this welfare ranking of the tax instruments. While the distributional
effects of VAT reforms are within a relatively narrow range, the industry effects (in
terms of variation in industry output) are much more pronounced. This indicates
that the VAT rate differentiation can be viewed primarily as an industry-specific
subsidy rather than an instrument of redistribution. From a political economy point
of view, the sectoral implications highlight lobbying interests of adversely affected
sectors to work against changes of the actual VAT structure.
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Abstract
In the tax policy debate, differentiation of value-added taxes is often justified
by distributional concerns. Our quantitative analysis for Germany indicates
that such concerns are misplaced. We find that the abolition of VAT differ-
entiation has only negligible redistributive effects. Instead, reduced VAT are
found to act as industry-specific subsidies. Whereas the overall welfare effects
of pure VAT reforms are very small, a revenue-neutral introduction of a har-
monised VAT combined with reductions in the marginal income tax rates or
social security contributions turns out to produce substantial welfare gains for
all households.
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1 Introduction
Consumption taxation through value-added taxes (VAT) is usually considered as
a relatively efficient way of raising public funds. Theoretical analysis points to the
neutrality of VAT with respect to intertemporal consumption decisions, whereas in-
come taxes tend to distort the trade-off between consumption and savings. On the
other hand, a uniform VAT is often criticised on the basis of its allegedly regres-
sive distributional effects. Reflecting distributional concerns, many countries apply
VAT reductions to specific goods, which make up a larger share in the consump-
tion of low-income households. In the EU, all countries but one use reduced VAT
rates for specific consumption commodities. Especially in the old EU member states
VAT reductions on food, water, medication, and public transport are quite common
(European Commission, 2005).
This paper addresses the question to what extent VAT differentiation can be ra-
tionalised on distributional grounds. VAT differentiation is an indirect instrument
of distribution as it is not associated with the individual ability to pay of different
consumers. There are more direct instruments of distributive policy such as income
taxation or monetary transfers. Thus, from an applied policy perspective, we must
be concerned with how large the redistributive effects of VAT differentiation are
in practice, and whether or not alternative policy instruments are more effective
as redistributive devices. Answers to these concerns cannot be given by abstract
theoretical considerations. They depend on the precise type of products favoured
by VAT reductions and the demand and supply conditions on the respective mar-
kets, which are determined by household preferences, production technologies, factor
endowments, and the market structure.1
In this paper, we employ an applied general equilibrium (AGE) approach to in-
vestigate efficiency and distributional impacts for structural VAT reforms based on
1In the public finance literature a number of reasons are mentioned why VAT differentiation
might be justified under efficiency considerations: (i) administrative and compliance costs (Keen
and Mintz, 2004), (ii) the existence of shadow markets, (iii) differences in price elasticities of
goods, or (iv) complementarity of consumption goods with untaxed leisure activities. However,
these reasons are either difficult to ascertain on empirical grounds (due to the lack of data) or
irrelevant in policy practice. (As a prime example VAT reductions are applied to goods with
inelastic demand such as food, which is contrary to optimal taxation reasoning.) More recently,
VAT reductions have also been proposed as a measure to stimulate employment in labour intensive
service industries.
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empirically observed data for Germany. The AGE approach provides a comprehen-
sive framework for studying the effects of policy interference on all markets of an
economy, rigorously based on microeconomic theory. The simultaneous considera-
tion of the origin and spending of the agents’ income makes it possible to address
both economy-wide efficiency as well as distributional impacts of policy regulation.
This has made AGE models a standard tool for the quantitative analysis in many
policy domains including fiscal, trade and environmental policy.
The strand of AGE literature that is directed to the analysis of VAT reforms is
relatively small compared to other public finance issues such as income taxation or
pension reform: Ballard et al. (1987) analyse VAT in the USA as a possibility to
increase the dynamic efficiency of the tax system. Hamilton and Whalley (1989) use
a static model to explore special intricacies of the interaction of federal and provin-
cial taxes in Canada. Gottfried and Wiegard (1991) focus on the implementation
of the VAT and compare two different institutional settings, tax exemption vs. zero
rating, for the German economy. Dixon and Rimmer (1999) use a dynamic model
for Australia to investigate VAT reforms with a special focus on the induced interna-
tional trade effects. In a more recent paper, Åvitsland and Aasness (2004) combine
a dynamic AGE and a microsimulation model to assess VAT reform scenarios for
Norway.
In Germany, the VAT has a standard and a reduced rate. The latter applies mostly
to food, public transport, and print-media products. We use our AGE model to
simulate variants of a revenue-neutral abolition of the reduced VAT rate. The results
of the simulations confirm doubts about the effectiveness of reduced VAT rates as a
redistributive instrument and point to welfare gains from uniform taxation. These
welfare gains are boosted if taxes other than VAT are included in the tax reform.
Among alternative sources of revenue which keep the overall budget constant (tax
recycling instruments), revenue-neutral reductions in marginal income tax rates and
— in particular — cuts in the social security contributions provide larger welfare
gains. At the sectoral level, the reduced VAT rate works mainly as a subsidy to the
respective final-goods producers and their intermediate-input suppliers.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of the model structure and parametrisation. Section 3 provides the results of the
scenario simulations. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Model and Parametrisation
For our simulation analysis we draw on a standard AGE model which has been re-
fined to address central issues of VAT reforms.2 Specific extensions include the disag-
gregation of the household sector into income terciles, where each tercile has a special
income composition and consumption structure. For the empirical parametrisation of
the model, various data sources are used including the German Input-Output Table
for 1997, the production-consumption transition matrix — the so-called “Z-matrix”,
and the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) have been combined to
form a consistent benchmark dataset.
In the following, we first summarise the basic features of our AGE model (Sec-
tion 2.1). A detailed description of the household representation follows in Section
2.2. Finally, we discuss data and calibration issues (Section 2.3). A comprehensive
algebraic summary of the model is provided in the appendix.
2.1 Basic Model Structure
Firms and factors of production
The AGE model underlying our VAT reform analysis for Germany features 69 pro-
duction sectors. In each sector, output is produced from intermediate inputs, capital,
and labour of two skill types (high skilled and low skilled). Production possibilities
are characterised through nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) produc-
tion functions, which describe the trade-off between various inputs. Perfect compe-
tition implies that there are no pure profits. The primary factors labour and capital
are remunerated according to their respective marginal productivities. Cost min-
imisation by firms yields demand functions for production inputs at the sectoral
level.
The domestic labour market is characterised through frictions and equilibrium un-
employment. We make use of a wage-curve relationship in which the rate of unem-
ployment is linked to the degree of progressivity of the income tax due to an implicit
wage-bargaining mechanism (Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996). Capital is fully mobile
2Specifically adapted refinements of the standard model have been applied recently to the
climate policy debate (Böhringer and Lange, 2005) and labour market policies (Böhringer, Boeters,
and Feil, 2005).
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across sectors, and the domestic capital market is perfectly competitive. At the in-
ternational level, domestic and foreign capital are treated as imperfect substitutes
to account for less than perfect international capital mobility. The calibration of the
respective parameters is discussed in Section 2.3.3.
σY
sectoral output
intermediate InputsKLE aggregate
KE aggregate high
skilled
labour
low
skilled
labour
σM
from different sectors
σKLE
σKE
capital energy
σE
different energy carriers
Figure 1: Production structure for a representative sector
In Figure 1 we adopt the following notation:
σY := elasticity of substitution between the aggregate of intermediate pro-
duction inputs and the input composite of labour, capital and en-
ergy,
σKLE := elasticity of substitution between the capital-energy aggregate and
(skilled as well as unskilled) labour,
σM := elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs entering the
sectoral composite of intermediate inputs,
σKE := elasticity of substitution between capital and aggregate energy,
σE := elasticity of substitution between different energy carriers entering
the aggregate energy input.
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Foreign trade
Domestically produced goods are converted through a constant-elasticity-of-trans-
formation function into goods destined for the domestic market and the export
market, respectively. Export and import prices in foreign currency are considered
as exogenous (small-open-economy assumption). Analogously to the export side,
we adopt the Armington assumption of product heterogeneity for imports. A CES
function characterises the trade-off between imported and domestically produced
varieties of the same good. The Armington good enters intermediate and final de-
mand. Foreign closure of the model is warranted through the balance-of-payments
constraint.
Government budget
Given our focus on VAT reform, the model emphasises the role of consumption
taxation. The VAT captures differences across consumption categories with three
levels of the tax rate (full rate, reduced rate, and tax exempt goods). Furthermore,
we account for the indirect impact of value-added taxation in the production of goods
which are tax exempt. Besides the VAT, direct taxes and social security contributions
of households are differentiated by household types. Social security contributions are
assumed to be proportional to labour income while income taxation takes the form
of a linear progressive schedule (tax allowance combined with a constant marginal
tax rate). Finally, the model contains sectoral output taxes and subsidies as well as
import and export levies.
Private households
We distinguish three representative households capturing the lower, middle, and up-
per tercile of the income distribution. Each household takes a labour-leisure decision
and chooses between different consumption goods. Details about the characteristics
of the disaggregated households are provided in the following section.
2.2 Representation of the Household Sector
2.2.1 Household Disaggregation
The private household sector is disaggregated into three households representing,
respectively, the lower, middle and upper income tercile of the households according
to the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS). The EVS is a representa-
tive household survey by the German Federal Statistical Office. The 1998 sample
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comprises 62.000 households. The first part of the survey reports data on household
structure, housing situation, financial and tangible assets as well as debt. The sec-
ond part contains income and expenditure items adapted to the classification of the
input-output accounts.
Households are grouped into the three income terciles according to their “equivalent
household income”. Household income is divided by the respective number of house-
hold members in order to compare households of different sizes. We use the square
root of the household size as equivalence scale to compute the respective number
of household members, thereby reflecting economies of scale due to fixed costs in
household consumption.3 The income and expenditure values of the three fictitious
representative households are then set to the arithmetic mean of the respective in-
come class.
Table 1 summarises basic characteristics of the household types. Disposable income
— the sum of the rows “consumption” and “savings” — varies substantially across the
three terciles. Taking the first tercile as the basis of comparison, disposable income
of the second tercile is higher by roughly one half, whereas the disposable income
of the third tercile is three times as high. Less than two thirds of gross income (or
not even more than one third as in the case of the first tercile) are made up of
factor income. The residual income consists mainly of transfer payments, pensions
and private credit (with “savings” meaning gross savings). The income tax schedule
is progressive as can be seen from the average and marginal tax rates4; in addition,
we report the implicit tax allowances associated with a linear progressive income
tax scheme. Average social security contributions (SSC) are decreasing in income
due to an assessment threshold for the base of SSC.
Labour supply of the representative households is split into skilled and unskilled
labour by summing up skill-specific incomes of all individual households in the re-
spective tercile. We assume a uniform wage per skill type which amounts to an
efficiency weighting of individual working hours. Furthermore, the unemployment
rate is assumed to be uniform across households (but different for the skill types)
and is calculated by summing up employed and unemployed persons in the terciles.
We count the registered unemployed as involuntary unemployed while the unem-
ployed that are not registered are classified as voluntary unemployed.
Table 2 reports the consumption shares of the household terciles by VAT categories.
3Cf. e.g. Biewen (2000) or Atkinson et al. (1995, 18ff.) for alternative scales.
4The percentage numbers are given relative to gross factor income.
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lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
Consumption 1738 (78%) 2317 (62%) 3674 (51%)
Savings 256 (11%) 788 (21%) 2427 (33%)
Taxes and SSC 237 (11%) 618 (17%) 1179 (16%)
Factor income 753 (34%) 2045 (55%) 4385 (60%)
Other income 1477 (66%) 1678 (45%) 2895 (40%)
Average tax rate 10.0% 12.8% 16.5%
Average SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
Marginal tax rate 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
Implied tax allowance 247 417 1127
Rows (1) to (5): absolute values in € per month and percentage values as
shares in gross income; rows (6) to (8): percentage of factor or labour
income, respectively
Table 1: Household characteristics according to EVS
It can be seen that the share of the three VAT categories in consumption is rather
stable (upper part of Table 2). This is especially the case for the tax-exempt goods,
while the shares of the reduced-rate goods are slightly decreasing and those of the
full-rate goods are slightly increasing in income. The figures in Table 2 already
suggest that a differentiated VAT rate may not be well suited as a redistributive
device. In relation to the disposable income (lower part of Table 2), the share of all
VAT categories is decreasing, simply because of the increasing propensity to save.
lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
Share in consumption
VAT 0% 38.8% 37.2% 37.2%
VAT 7% 27.3% 25.6% 23.7%
VAT 15% 33.9% 37.2% 39.1%
Share in disposable income
VAT 0% 33.8% 27.7% 22.4%
VAT 7% 23.8% 19.1% 14.3%
VAT 15% 29.5% 27.8% 23.6%
Table 2: Household consumption structure
The expenditure shares of the consumption good categories are calculated as frac-
tions of the so-called “income available for expenditures”. The latter is defined as
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the sum of disposable income, sales of goods and property, pensions from private
insurances, liquidation of financial and tangible assets and from bank and consump-
tion credit loans. The household budget is then balanced by the residual income
category called “other income” (see Table 1). The expenditure categories of the
EVS are subjected to several adjustments in order to warrant consistency with the
12-goods-classification of the Z-matrix. In order to enable us to discuss a structural
VAT reform detailed EVS expenditure shares for each of the 12 categories have been
grouped into categories with VAT of 16 percent, 7 percent or tax exemption, respec-
tively. Corresponding data has been provided by the German federal statistical office
in the form of a special Z-matrix differentiated according to VAT rates.
2.2.2 Consumption Structure
The consumption structure of the three representative households is reflected in the
nesting of multi-level utility functions adopted within the numerical AGE model
(see Figure 2). Current utility is composed of commodity consumption and leisure
(of the two skill varieties). Commodity consumption in turn is an aggregate of food
consumption and other consumption goods (which are then further decomposed
at the lower level). Food consumption is explicitly represented because it is the
most important consumption goods category to which the reduced VAT rate is
applied in Germany. All consumption good categories are finally broken down into
the three VAT categories (tax exempt goods, reduced and full VAT rate) according
to their empirical shares (see Table 2). At the top, the utility tree might be extended
by the decision between current and future consumption. We make this margin of
substitution exogenous by fixing the volume of savings for each of the households.
In Figure 2 we adopt the following notation:
σU := elasticity of substitution between current consumption and leisure,
σC := elasticity of substitution between food and the non-food consump-
tion aggregate,
σLE := elasticity of substitution between leisure of high skilled and low
skilled labour,
σV AT := elasticity of substitution between commodities subject to (three)
different VAT categories,
σNF := elasticity of substitution between consumption commodities enter-
ing the non-food consumption composite.
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Figure 2: Consumption structure of representative household
2.3 Parametrisation
2.3.1 Input-Output Data
In a comparative-static analysis, policy effects are assessed with respect to a refer-
ence situation — the benchmark — where no policy changes apply. The benchmark
is typically determined by economic transactions in a particular benchmark year.
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, benchmark quantities and
prices — together with exogenous elasticities — are used to calibrate the model. They
determine the free parameters of the functional forms that capture production tech-
nologies and consumer preferences.
We use the input-output table of the German federal statistical office for the year
1997 as the central data source for model calibration. The first quadrant of the
input-output table reports intermediate inputs for each sector. The second quadrant
provides information on final demand components: private and public consumption,
investment, inventory changes, and exports. Factor payments to labour and capital
(combined with profits in the row “operating surplus”) are included in the third
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quadrant which also reports the inflows of foreign goods and services to each pro-
duction sector. As to taxes, the standard input-output table records product-specific
taxes and subsidies as well as the VAT.
Output by production sector is linked to consumption by private households in terms
of expenditure categories through the Z-matrix, see above.
2.3.2 Calibration of the Utility Function
The calibration of the parameters of the utility function (see Figure 2) requires the
integration of empirical estimates for labour supply and consumption demand.
Labour supply elasticity
The utility function (see appendix for the algebraic specification) includes leisure of
two skill types implying uncompensated labour supply elasticities, εh,j, for household
h and skill type j:
εh,j = (ζh − 1)
£
σLEh (1− θh,j) + σUh θh,j(1− θLE,h,j) + θh,jθLE,h,j − θI,h,j
¤
(1)
where
ζh := labour endowment as a multiple of actual labour supply,
θh,j := share of leisure of type j in all leisure,
θLE,h,j := share of the leisure aggregate in total current utility,
θI,h,j := share of labour endowment of type j in extended income,
(including leisure and non-labour income).
With exogenous shares, labour supply (ζ) set to 1.75 (70 hours of weekly labour
endowment relative to an average weekly working time of 40 hours), and given the
elasticities εh,j, it is straightforward to invert the two equations (1), j = high, low
skilled, for the unknown elasticities σLE and σU . Our reading of the empirical liter-
ature on labour supply elasticities (for a survey see, e.g., Borjas, 2000) is that there
are no strong results on skill- or income-bracket-specific labour supply elasticities
and that uncompensated labour supply elasticities are centred around 0.15. So we
calibrated the model to εh,L = εh,H = 0.15.
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Consumption demand elasticities
At the lower nests of the utility tree of Figure 2, taking the upper-level elasticities
as given, we can solve recursively for the elasticities of interest, σC and σNF :
σCh =
1
1− θh,F
£
−εF − σUh θh,F (1− θh,C) + θh,F θh,C
¤
σNFh =
1
1− θ¯h,NF
£
−ε¯NF − σCh θ¯h,NF (1− θh,NF )
−σUh θ¯h,NFθh,NF (1− θh,C)− θ¯h,NFθh,NFθh,C
¤
where
εF := own-price elasticity of food demand,
ε¯NF := average own-price elasticity of demand for non-food goods,
θh,C := share of consumption in current utility,
θh,F := share of food in the consumption goods aggregate,
θh,NF := share of all non-food goods in the consumption goods aggregate,
θ¯h,NF := average share of individual non-food goods in the non-food
aggregate.
With respect to the price elasticities of consumption demand we draw on Chen
(1999), who estimates consumption demand parameters for 42 OECD countries.
Chen uses a differential estimation approach according to Theil (1980) and assumes
preference indifference. His estimates for Germany and the mean of the estimates
for the 42 countries investigated are given in Table 3. Due to differences regarding
the definitions of product categories, we only distinguish between the price elasticity
of food (-.222) and the average price elasticity for the remaining 7 categories (-.563)
in the model.
2.3.3 Calibration of International Capital Mobility
The calibration of the production structure in Figure 1 is a standard exercise in
AGE modelling, except for the part that concerns international capital mobility. We
have capital mobility in two directions: capital imports and capital exports. For the
elasticity of capital imports with respect to the domestic interest rate, εKM , we can
calculate from the production function (Figure 1):
εKM = σK(1− θKM)− σKE(1− θKM)(1− θK)− σKEL(1− θKM)θK(1− θKE)
where
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Product category Germany Mean
Food -.222 -.220
Clothing -.423 -.422
Housing -.426 -.432
Durable consumption goods -.501 -.585
Health -.844 -.734
Traffic -.591 -.665
Recreation -.608 -.628
Other -.547 -.605
Table 3: Price elasticities of consumption demand
σK := elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital,
θKM := share of capital imports in domestic capital use,
θK := share of capital in the capital-energy sub-aggregate,
θKE := share of KE in the capital-energy-labour sub-aggregate,
and elasticities of substitution, σ, like in Figure 1.
We calibrate σK to match values of the capital import ratio (one minus the “domestic
ownership share”), θKM = 0.18 (French and Poterba, 1991), and the elasticity of
capital imports with respect to the domestic interest rate εKM = 2.4 (de Mooij and
Ederveen, 2001).
The elasticity of capital exports with respect to the domestic interest rate can be
computed from the constant-elasticity-of-transformation function, splitting up do-
mestic savings into capital exports and domestically used capital. Here we have:
εKX = −ηKS(1− θKX)
where
ηKS := elasticity of transformation (1− σKS) between capital exports
and domestically used capital,
θKX := share of capital exports in domestic savings.
ηKS is calibrated to values of the capital export ratio (one minus the “domestic equity
share”), θKX = 0.21 (French and Poterba, 1991), and the elasticity of capital exports
with respect to the domestic interest rate εKX = −2.4 (de Mooij and Ederveen,
2001).
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3 Simulations
In our simulations of revenue-neutral VAT reforms for the German economy we
replace the differentiated VAT rate by a uniform rate (while the treatment of tax-
exempt goods remains unchanged). Regarding the use of the additional revenues we
employ alternative assumptions. Basically, we distinguish two variants. In the first
variant of a pure VAT reform, we introduce a uniform VAT rate at a level which
keeps revenue constant. In the second variant, the rate for commodities with lower
VAT is set at the normal level. This implies that revenues from VAT increase, and
we balance the public budget through uniform adjustments of income taxes or social
security contributions. In addition to simulations with uniform adjustment of the
compensating source of revenue across households, we carry out simulations with
non-uniform adjustments such that not only revenue-neutrality but also distributive
neutrality is warranted.
3.1 Distributive Effects and Efficiency
Our discussion of simulation results starts with a scenario in which the differen-
tiated VAT (16% and 7%, respectively) is replaced in a revenue-neutral way by a
uniform VAT rate at an intermediate level (Scenario 1). Taking general equilibrium
repercussions into account, the level of the post-reform VAT amounts to 14.1% (as
compared to 16% normal VAT rate before).
The redistributive effects of this pure VAT reform are reported in Table 4 both in
terms of equivalent variation in percent of the benchmark income and in terms of
absolute changes. Reflecting the higher share of goods with a reduced VAT rate in
the expenditures of the lowest tercile (see Table 2), Scenario 1 has some adverse
distributional effects. However, these redistributive effects of switching to a uniform
VAT are very small. We furthermore see that the gain for the upper tercile — while
lower than the loss of the lower tercile in relative terms — is higher in absolute terms.
Scenario 1 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
EV in per cent -0.24 +0.00 +0.18
EV in € per month -5.8 +0.1 +16.6
Table 4: Pure VAT reform
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Next, we analyse different varieties of tax reforms that use other tax recycling in-
struments than the VAT itself for balancing the public budget. In Scenario 2, we
uniformly (in percentage points) cut the marginal income tax rate (MITR) to war-
rant revenue neutrality.
Scenario 2 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform MITR 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
post-reform MITR 14.1% 15.3% 21.3%
EV in per cent -0.62 -0.02 +0.39
EV in € per month -15.1 -0.8 +35.9
Table 5: Uniform cut in MITR
Table 5 indicates that the distributional effects are larger than for the case of a pure
VAT reform. While the middle tercile is still virtually unaffected by the reform, the
losses for the lower tercile and the gains for the upper tercile are more than double
the respective figures of Scenario 1. Uniform cuts in the marginal income tax rate
are favourable for the upper tercile because taxable income makes up the largest
fraction of total income in this tercile.
In Scenario 3, we maintain the marginal income tax as the recycling instrument for
balancing the public budget, but impose the restriction of distributive neutrality.
The marginal income tax rate (MITR) is now endogenously adjusted so that the
percentage change in EV is the same across all households. Table 6 summarises the
implications of this (non-uniform) adjustment rule.
Scenario 3 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform MITR 14.9% 16.1% 22.1%
post-reform MITR 12.6% 15.2% 21.6%
EV in per cent +0.12 +0.12 +0.12
EV in € per month +2.9 +5.2 +10.9
Table 6: Redistributively neutral cut in MITR
The tax reduction of the MITR (in terms of the tax rate) is highest for the lower
tercile (−2.3 p.p.) and lowest for the upper tercile (−0.5 p.p.). This results in a
uniform increase in the equivalent variation of 0.12%.
Tax revenue recycling through the income tax may alternatively be based on the
income tax allowance (ITA). Table 7 reports scenario results for the case of a uniform
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increase (in €) of the tax allowance for all households (Scenario 4).
Scenario 4 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform ITA in € 247 417 1127
post-reform ITA in € 260 430 1140
EV in per cent -0.10 -0.10 -0.12
EV in € per month -2.5 -4.2 -11.7
Table 7: Uniform increase in ITA
In this scenario, all households face welfare losses, reflecting the implied increase in
the marginal tax burden. Moreover, the losses are almost identical across terciles.
This latter result can be explained by two countervailing effects that more or less
cancel each other out. On the one hand, a given increase of the ITA in € means a
lower relative increase for the upper terciles. On the other hand, the upper terciles
have higher marginal income tax rates, so that they benefit more from a given
relative increase in the tax allowance.
The policy settings for Scenario 5 differ from those of Scenario 4 only in that tax
allowances are differentiated endogenously in order to yield proportional welfare
changes across all households. Distributional results are provided in Table 8. As
Scenario 4 was almost distributionally neutral, the results for Scenario 5 are very
much alike.
Scenario 5 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform ITA in € 247 417 1127
post-reform ITA in € 261 430 1140
EV in per cent -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
EV in € per month -2.8 -4.9 -10.4
Table 8: Redistributively neutral increase in ITA
Given distributional neutrality for Scenarios 3 and 5, both scenarios can be compared
in efficiency terms. We can then see that Scenario 5 induces (small) welfare losses,
while Scenario 3 leads to (small) efficiency gains. The reasoning behind this is that
in Scenario 5 we essentially replace a lumpsum tax by a distortive tax, whereas in
Scenario 3 we trade off two distortive taxes against each other.
The third instrument of tax revenue recycling considered in our analysis are the
social security contributions (SSC). Again, we first show the case where the SSC are
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changed uniformly (Scenario 6), and then differentiate the SSC of the households
endogenously to achieve proportional welfare gains across households (Scenario 7).
Scenario 6 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
post-reform SSC 21.3% 18.4% 11.4%
EV in per cent -0.26 +0.34 +0.30
EV in € per month -6.3 +14.9 +27.7
Table 9: Uniform cut in SSC
A uniform proportional decrease of the SSC — as in Table 9 — leaves the middle tercile
substantially better off. The welfare gain for the upper tercile is also significant,
whereas the lower tercile clearly loses. The fact that the middle tercile benefits most
is explained by the highest share of labour income (the tax base for the SSC) in this
group. In contrast, for the lower tercile, transfer income makes up a large part of
total income, and for the upper tercile capital income gains in weight.
Scenario 7 lower tercile middle tercile upper tercile
pre-reform SSC 23.5% 20.4% 12.7%
post-reform SSC 20.0% 18.7% 11.6%
EV in per cent +0.21 +0.21 +0.21
EV in € per month +5.1 +9.0 +18.9
Table 10: Redistributively neutral cut in SSC
When we adjust the SSC in a way that assures distributive neutrality (see Table 10),
the cut in SSC is highest for the lower tercile (−3.5 p.p.) and lowest for the upper
tercile (−1.1 p.p.). In relative terms, the cut is now lowest for the middle tercile
(to compensate for its high share of labour income). The uniform welfare increase
amounts to 0.21%, which stands out as the highest value across all scenarios and
makes the SSC the most attractive candidate for actual tax reforms. Our results
indicate that the distortive effects of the SSC are higher than those of the MITR,
which in turn means that distortive effects of labour taxation outweigh those of
capital income taxation.
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3.2 Macroeconomic Effects
Table 11 summarises the macroeconomic consequences across four of our scenarios:
the pure VAT reform (Scenario 1) and the three scenarios based on alternative
tax recycling instruments (Scenarios 3, 5 and 7) where distributional effects are
compensated.
Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
GDP 0.11 0.36 -0.10 0.45
Employment 0.02 0.14 -0.25 0.36
Domestic capital use 0.25 0.68 0.10 0.57
Total consumption 0.08 0.26 -0.30 0.49
Imports -0.32 -0.26 -0.64 -0.05
Exports -0.03 0.47 -0.47 0.54
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 11: Macroeconomic Effects of VAT reform
Table 11 confirms the ranking of the tax recycling instruments that we already de-
duced from the EV values in Section 3.1. The SSC are the most favourable tax
recycling instrument, followed by the MITR, the VAT itself, and the ITA at the
bottom of the ranking. The same ranking holds with respect to key economic indi-
cators such as GDP, employment, domestic capital use, aggregate consumption, or
exports.
3.3 Industry Effects
Table 12 reports the impacts of VAT reforms on the output of individual industries.
We condense the information on the 69 sectors of the model into a few aggregate
indicators: the average (unweighted) sectoral output growth and its standard devi-
ation, the number of growing and shrinking industries, maximum and minimum of
the industries’ growth rates as well as the 10th and 90th percentile.
The figures in Table 12 confirm our previous ranking of the tax recycling instru-
ments. Around the average values, there is a considerable spread in the industry-level
outcomes. This spread is rather robust across the scenarios. At the disaggregated
industry-level, the performance across sectors is also rather stable: Financial and
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Scenario 1 3 5 7
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
Av. increase in industries’ production 0.10 0.46 -0.21 0.48
Standard deviation 1.08 1.18 1.17 1.06
Number of growing industries 32 48 19 56
Number of shrinking industries 37 21 50 13
Maximum growth 5.45 5.66 5.38 5.60
Minimum growth -2.02 -1.61 -2.82 -1.05
90th percentile 0.56 1.38 0.41 0.91
10th percentile -0.59 -0.26 -1.01 -0.18
Entries are changes in percent (except number of growing/shrinking industries).
Table 12: Sectoral effects
Insurance services as well as Research and Development are always among the in-
dustries that gain the most, whereas Communication and Media, Other Vehicles and
Hotel and Catering Industry show the largest losses.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The fact that SSC is more advantageous as a tax recycling instrument than MITR
indicates that the taxation of labour is more distorting than the taxation of capital.
However, if capital were more mobile, internationally, than assumed in the simula-
tions, the distortionary effects of capital taxation increase and the MITR might be
expected to perform relatively better as a tax recycling instrument. Since the degree
of capital mobility is subject to controversial debates, we single out the elasticities
of international capital mobility as the model parameters for a more detailed sensi-
tivity analysis: We double the values of the international capital mobility elasticities
(capital import and export elasticities).
Table 13 shows that the ranking of the scenarios does not change as compared
to the base case.5 SSC (Scenario 7s) remain the most advantageous tax recycling
instrument. As expected, the difference between Scenarios 3 and 7 (MITR and SSC
as tax recycling instruments) decreases with increasing capital mobility — however,
this reduction is rather small even for the assumed doubling of elasticities. This
5Table 13 is augmented by a row “Welfare (EV)” to be compared with the respective entries in
Tables 6, 8 and 10 in Section 3.1.
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Scenario 1s 3s 5s 7s
Tax recycling instrument VAT MITR ITA SSC
Welfare (EV) 0.16 -0.11 0.24
GDP 0.15 0.46 -0.09 0.53
Employment 0.03 0.19 -0.25 0.41
Domestic capital use 0.30 0.85 0.12 0.70
Total consumption 0.11 0.34 -0.29 0.57
Imports -0.31 -0.22 -0.64 -0.01
Exports -0.04 0.70 -0.45 0.71
Table entries are given as percentage changes.
Table 13: Macroeconomic Effects
indicates that the MITR can become a serious competitor of the SSC only for degrees
of international capital mobility that are far above empirically reported values (see
e.g. de Mooij and Ederveen, 2001).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the economic effects of VAT reform for the
German economy. Based on an AGE framework tailored to the requirements of VAT
reform analysis, we have simulated several revenue-neutral variants of abolishing
the reduced VAT rate in Germany. We have compared a pure VAT reform, where
the differentiated VAT is replaced with a uniform rate, and scenarios in which tax
revenue is recycled through other taxes: the marginal income tax rate (MITR), the
income tax allowance (ITA) or the social security contributions (SSC).
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: The abolition of the reduced VAT
rate in itself has only a small redistributive effect towards more inequality. Therefore,
VAT differentiation can hardly be considered as a suitable means of redistribution
policy. When we combine the abolition of reduced VAT rates with revenue recy-
cling through reduction of the marginal income tax rate or cuts in social security
contributions, there is scope for significant gains in overall welfare. The income tax
allowance, in contrast, produces welfare losses if used as a tax recycling instru-
ment. Policy-induced changes in macroeconomic indicators like GDP, employment,
domestic capital use, or aggregate consumption echo the welfare ranking of tax in-
struments. While the distributional effects of VAT reforms are within a relatively
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narrow range, the sectoral effects (in terms of variation in sectoral output) are much
more pronounced. This indicates that the VAT rate differentiation should be viewed
primarily as a sectoral subsidy rather than an instrument of redistribution. From a
political economy point of view, the sectoral implications highlight lobbying interests
of adversely affected sectors to work against changes of the actual VAT structure.
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I Appendix: Model Description
In this appendix we give a full algebraic description of the model. A list of all sets,
indices, variables and parameters can be found in Sections I.1 to I.3. Section I.4 then
presents the equations, classified into price and demand equations, market clearance
conditions and household budget constraints.
I.1 Indices and Index Sets
I.1.1 Sets
c := consumption good index
h := household index
i := general index
s, ss := sectoral indices
sg := index for skill groups (high, low skilled)
I.1.2 Index Sets
C := all 12 consumption good categories
ELE := one-element set: electricity
F := one-element set: food consumption
FEN := fossil energy sectors
NEN := non-energy sectors
NF := non-food consumption goods
S := all 69 sectors of the German IOT 1997
V AT := different VAT rates
I.2 Variables
I.2.1 Quantities
As := Armington good
As,c := intermediate inputs for consumption (Z-matrix)
As,G := intermediate input for government consumption
As,I := intermediate input for investment goods
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As,ss := intermediate inputs for production
As,STK := stock changes
Cc := consumption goods
Cc,h := consumption goods by household
Cc,h,V AT := consumption goods by VAT category
Ch := consumption good aggregate
Ds := deliveries to the domestic market
Ec := energy aggregate in consumption
Es := energy aggregate in production
FEc := fossil energy aggregate in consumption
FEs := fossil energy aggregate in production
G := government consumption
I := aggregate investment
IG := government investment
K := total capital employed domestically
Ks := capital input
KD := domestically invested capital
KDh := domestically invested capital by household
KEs := capital-energy aggregate in production
KELs := quantity of capital-energy-labour aggregate
KM := capital imports
KXh := capital exports
Ls,sg := labour input by skill group
LEh := leisure aggregate
LEh,sg := leisure by skill group
Ms := imports
NFh := non-food consumption
Uh := utility index
Xs := Exports
Ys := production in sector s
I.2.2 Prices
pA,s := price of Armington commodity
pc := price of consumption goods (gross of VAT)
pC,h := price of consumption goods aggregate
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pp,c := production price of consumption good
pD,s := price of output delivered to the domestic market
pE,c := price of energy aggregate in consumption
pE,s := price of energy aggregate in production
pF := price of food consumption
pG := price index of government consumption
pFE,c := price of fossil energy aggregate in consumption
pFE,s := price of fossil energy aggregate in production
pI := price index for investment goods
pK := rental rate of capital
pKE,s := price of the capital-energy aggregate
pKEL,s := price of the capital-energy-labour aggregate
pKD := price of capital in the domestic market
pKM := price of capital imports
pKS,h := price for capital supply of households
pKX := price of capital exports
pL,sg := wage (net of payroll tax) by skill group
pLE,h := price index for leisure
pLE,h,sg := price index for leisure, by skill group
pLS,h,sg := expected revenue from labour supply
pM,s := import prices (net of import tax)
pNF,h := price of non-food aggregate consumption
pU,h := price of utility aggregate (expenditure function)
pX,s := export prices
pY,s := producer prices
I.2.3 Others
usg := unemployment rate
Yh := extended income of households
I.3 Parameters
I.3.1 Value Shares
θi := value share of item i in its respective sub-aggregate in the benchmark
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I.3.2 Taxes
tI,h := marginal income tax rate
tKM := capital import tax
tPR,sg := payroll tax (employer’s social security contributions)
tS,h := social security contributions of households
tV AT := value-added tax on consumption goods
tY,s := output tax (sum of taxes and subsidies)
TAh := income tax allowance
I.3.3 Elasticities
σAs := EOS between domestic production and imports 2.0
σCh := EOS between food and non-food consumption
σEc := EOS between electricity and fossil fuels 1.0
σEs := EOS between electricity and fossil fuels 0.25
σFEc := EOS between varieties of fossil fuels 1.0
σFEs := EOS between varieties of fossil fuels 1.0
σK := EOS between domestic capital and capital imports
σKEs := EOS between K and E 0.8
σKELs := EOS between KE and L 0.5
σKS := EOS between domestic and foreign investment
σLEh := EOS between leisure of different skill types
σNEc := EOS between NEN goods in consumption 0.5
σNFh := EOS between non-food goods
σTs := EOT between domestic use and exports 2.0
σUh := EOS between leisure and consumption
σV ATc := EOS between good varieties with different VAT rate 1.0
σYs := EOS between intermediate inputs and KEL aggregate 0.0
σUh and σ
LE
h are calibrated to reproduce empirical labour supply elasticities.
σK and σKS are calibrated to reproduce capital import and export elasticities.
σCh and σ
NF
h are calibrated to reproduce consumption good demand elasticities.
The calibration procedures are explained in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the main
text.
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I.3.4 Others
b := unemployment benefits
BOP := balance of payments surplus
I¯h := savings = investment by household
K¯h := capital endowment by household
L¯h,sg := time endowment by household
TRh := benchmark transfers
Any variable (or parameter in the case of taxes) with an upper bar denotes its
benchmark value.
I.4 Model Equations
The model equations are split up into price and demand equations, market clear-
ance conditions, budget constraints and auxiliary equations. There are no explicit
production functions in the model, because all necessary information is contained
in the dual price functions.
To maintain structural symmetry, the equations are written down in their most
general form. In the actual numerical implementation of the model, considerable
simplifications are achieved by normalising benchmark prices and quantities to unity
where possible. Some of the CES functions collapse to Cobb-Douglas or Leontief
functions by setting the elasticity of substitution to one or zero, respectively (see
Section I.3.3).
I.4.1 Price Equations
Production is organised according to a nested CES production function. Subsets of
sectoral inputs that are used to form sub-nests of the productions function can be
found in Section I.1.1.
pY,s(1− tY,s)
p¯Y,s(1− t¯Y,s)
=
"
θKELs
µ
pKEL,s
p¯KEL,s
¶1−σYs
+
X
ss∈NEN
θsss
µ
pA,ss
p¯A,ss
¶1−σYs # 11−σYs
(2)
pKEL,s
p¯KEL,s
=
"
θKEs
µ
pKE,s
p¯KE,s
¶1−σKELs
+
X
sg
θsgs
µ
pL,sg(1 + tPR,sg)
p¯L,sg(1 + t¯PR,sg)
¶1−σKELs # 11−σKELs
(3)
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pKE,s
p¯KE,s
=
"
θKs
µ
pK
p¯K
¶1−σKEs
+ θEs
µ
pE,s
p¯E,s
¶1−σKEs # 11−σKEs
(4)
pE,s
p¯E,s
=
"
θELEs
µ
pA,ELE
p¯A,ELE
¶1−σEs
+ θFECs
µ
pFE,s
p¯FE,s
¶1−σEs # 11−σEs
(5)
pFE,s
p¯FE,s
=
" X
i∈FEN
θis
µ
pA,i
p¯A,i
¶1−σFEs # 11−σFEs
(6)
Output is split into domestic use and exports through a CET function:
pY,s
p¯Y,s
=
"
θDYs
µ
pD,s
p¯D,s
¶1+σTs
+ θXs
µ
pX,s
p¯X,s
¶1+σTs # 11+σTs
(7)
Domestically produced goods and imports are combined to an “Armington good”:
pA,s
p¯A,s
=
"
θDAs
µ
pD,s
p¯D,s
¶1−σAs
+ θMs
µ
pM,s(1 + tM,s)
p¯M,s(1 + t¯M,s)
¶1−σAs # 11−σAs
(8)
Household utility is derived from consumption of goods and leisure:
pU,h
p¯U,h
=
"
θCh
µ
pC,h
p¯C,h
¶1−σUh
+ θLEh
µ
pLE,h
p¯LE,h
¶1−σUh # 11−σUh
(9)
pC,h
p¯C,h
=
"
θFh
µ
pF
p¯F
¶1−σCh
+ θNFh
µ
pNF,h
p¯NF,h
¶1−σCh # 11+σCh
(10)
pNF,h
p¯NF,h
=
"X
c∈NF
θch
µ
pc
p¯c
¶1−σNFh # 11−σNFh
(11)
pc
p¯c
=
"X
V AT
θc,V AT
µ
pp,c(1 + tV AT )
p¯p,c(1 + t¯V AT )
¶1−σV ATc # 11−σV ATc
for c ∈ F,NF (12)
pLE,h
p¯LE,h
=
" X
sg∈SG
θsgh
µ
pLE,h,sg
p¯LE,h,sg
¶1−σLEh # 11−σLEh
(13)
Consumption goods are produced from the output of the production sectors with a
CES production function:
pp,c
p¯p,c
=
" X
s∈NEN
θsc
µ
pA,s
p¯A,s
¶1−σNEc
+ θEc
µ
pE,c
p¯E,c
¶1−σNEc # 11−σNEc
(14)
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pE,c
p¯E,c
=
"
θELEc
µ
pA,ELE
p¯A,ELE
¶1−σEc
+ θFEc
µ
pFE,c
p¯FE,c
¶1−σEc # 11−σEc
(15)
pFE,c
p¯FE,c
=
" X
s∈FEN
θsc
µ
pA,s
p¯A,s
¶1−σFEc # 11−σFEc
(16)
Government demand is composed of government investment and inputs from the
production sectors in fixed proportions:
pG
p¯G
= θIG
pI
p¯I
+
X
s
θsG
pA,s
p¯A,s
(17)
Investment goods are also produced with fixed production coefficients:
pI
p¯I
=
X
s
θsI
pA,s
p¯A,s
(18)
Capital supply is transformed into domestic use and capital exports through a CET
function:
pKS,h
p¯KS,h
=
"
θKD
µ
pKD(1− tI,h)
p¯KD(1− t¯I,h)
¶1+σKS
+ θKX
µ
pKX
p¯KX
¶1+σKS# 11+σKS
(19)
Domestic and imported capital are imperfect substitutes in production:
pK
p¯K
=
"
θDK
µ
pKD
p¯KD
¶1−σK
+ θKM
µ
pKM(1 + tKM)
p¯KM(1 + t¯KM)
¶1−σK# 11−σK
(20)
I.4.2 Demand and Supply Equations
Demand for factors of production and intermediate inputs:
Ass,s
A¯ss,s
=
Ys
Y¯s
µ
pY,s(1− tY,s)
p¯Y,s(1− t¯Y,s)
p¯A,i
pA,i
¶σYs
for ss ∈ NEN (21)
KELs
KELs
=
Ys
Y¯s
µ
pY,s(1− tY,s)
p¯Y,s(1− t¯Y,s)
p¯KEL,s
pKEL,s
¶σYs
(22)
Ls,sg
L¯s,sg
=
KELs
KELs
µ
pKEL,s
p¯KEL,s
p¯L,sg(1 + t¯PR,sg)
pL,sg(1 + tPR,sg)
¶σKELs
(23)
KEs
KEs
=
KELs
KELs
µ
pKEL,s
p¯KEL,s
p¯KE,s
pKE,s
¶σKELs
(24)
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Ks
K¯s
=
KEs
KEs
µ
pKE,s
p¯KE,s
p¯K
pK
¶σKEs
(25)
Es
E¯s
=
KEs
KEs
µ
pKE,s
p¯KE,s
p¯E,s
pE,s
¶σKEs
(26)
AELE,s
A¯ELE,s
=
Es
E¯s
µ
pE,s
p¯E,s
p¯A,ELE
pA,ELE
¶σEs
(27)
FEs
FEs
=
Es
E¯s
µ
pE,s
p¯E,s
p¯FE,s
pFE,s
¶σEs
(28)
Ass,s
A¯ss,s
=
FEs
FEs
µ
pFE,s
p¯FE,s
p¯A,ss
pA,ss
¶σFEs
for ss ∈ FEN (29)
Supply to the domestic and export market:
Ds
D¯s
=
Ys
Y¯s
µ
p¯Y,s
pY,s
pD,s
p¯D,s
¶σTs
(30)
Xs
X¯s
=
Ys
Y¯s
µ
p¯Y,s
pY,s
pX,s
p¯X,s
¶σTs
(31)
Armington demands:
Ds
D¯s
=
As
A¯s
µ
pA,s
p¯A,s
p¯D,s
pD,s
¶σAs
(32)
Ms
M¯s
=
As
A¯s
µ
pA,s
p¯A,s
p¯M,s(1 + t¯M,s)
pM,s(1 + tM,s)
¶σAs
(33)
Household demand:
Ch
C¯h
=
Uh
U¯h
µ
pU,h
p¯U,h
p¯C,h
pC,h
¶σUh
(34)
LEh
LEh
=
Uh
U¯h
µ
pU,h
p¯U,h
p¯LE,h
pLE,h
¶σUh
(35)
CF,h
C¯F,h
=
Ch
C¯h
µ
pC,h
p¯C,h
p¯F
pF
¶σCh
(36)
NFh
NF h
=
Ch
C¯h
µ
pC,h
p¯C,h
p¯NF,h
pNF,h
¶σCh
(37)
Cc,h
C¯c,h
=
NFh
NF h
µ
pNF,h
p¯NF,h
p¯c
pc
¶σNFh
for c ∈ NF (38)
Cc,h,V AT
C¯c,h,V AT
=
Cc,h
C¯c,h
µ
pc
p¯c
p¯p,c(1 + t¯V AT )
pp,c(1 + tV AT )
¶σV ATc
for c ∈ F,NF (39)
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LEh,sg
LEh,sg
=
LEh
LEh
µ
pLE,h
p¯LE,h
p¯LE,h,sg
pLE,h,sg
¶σLEh
(40)
Demand of production output for consumption goods:
As,c
A¯s,c
=
Cc
C¯c
µ
pp,c
p¯p,c
p¯A,s
pA,s
¶σNEc
for s ∈ NEN (41)
Ec
E¯c
=
Cc
C¯c
µ
pp,c
p¯p,c
p¯E,c
pE,c
¶σNEc
(42)
AELE,c
A¯ELE,c
=
Ec
E¯c
µ
pE,c
p¯E,c
p¯A,ELE
pA,ELE
¶σEc
(43)
FEc
FEc
=
Ec
E¯c
µ
pE,c
p¯E,c
p¯FE,c
pFE,c
¶σEc
(44)
As,c
A¯s,c
=
FEc
FEc
µ
pFE,c
p¯FE,c
p¯A,s
pA,s
¶σFEc
for s ∈ FEN (45)
Government demand:
IG
I¯G
=
As,G
A¯s,G
=
G
G¯
(46)
Demand for inputs for investment good production:
As,I
A¯s,I
=
I
I¯
(47)
Demand for domestic and imported capital:
KD
KD
=
K
K¯
µ
pK
p¯K
p¯KD
pKD
¶σK
(48)
KM
KM
=
K
K¯
µ
pK
p¯K
p¯KM(1 + t¯KM)
pKM(1 + tKM)
¶σK
(49)
Supply of capital to the domestic and foreign market:
KDh
KDh
=
µ
p¯KS,h
pKS,h
pKD(1− tI,h)
p¯KD(1− t¯I,h)
¶σKS
(50)
KXh
KXh
=
µ
p¯KS,h
pKS,h
pKX
p¯KX
¶σKS
(51)
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I.4.3 Market Clearing Conditions
Armington good:
As =
X
ss
As,ss +
X
c
As,c +As,STK +As,G +As,I (52)
Capital: X
h
K¯h +KM = KX +KD +KM = KX +K = KX +
X
s
Ks (53)
Labour and leisure:
(1− usg)
X
h
(L¯h,sg − LEh,sg) =
X
s
Ls,sg (54)
Consumption goods:
Cc =
X
h
Cc,h (55)
Balance of payments:
BOP = BOP =
X
s
(pX,sXs − pM,sMs) (56)
All other market clearing conditions are trivial, because they consist only of a single
demand and a single supply component.
I.4.4 Household Budget Constraints
Budget constraints of private households (extended income):
Yh = pU,hUh = pKS,hK¯h +
ÃX
sg
pLS,h,sgL¯h,sg − TAh
!
(1− tI,h) + TRh − I¯h (57)
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Government budget constraint:
pGG =
X
s
(tY,spY,sYs + tM,spA,sMs) +
X
s,sg
tPR,sgpL,sgLs,sg
+ tKMpKMKM +
X
c,h,V AT
tV ATpp,cCc,h,V AT
+
X
h
tI,h
Ã
pKD,hKDh +
X
sg
(1− usg)(L¯h,sg − LEh,sg)pL,sg − TAh
!
+
X
h
tS,h
ÃX
sg
(1− usg)(L¯h,sg − LEh,sg)pL,sg
!
−
X
h
TRh −
X
s
pA,sAs,STK −BOP −
X
sg,h
usg(L¯h,sg − LEh,sg)
pC,h
p¯C,h
b (57)
I.4.5 Additional Equations for Unemployment
The supply price of labour is a weighted average of the after-tax wage and the
unemployment benefit, which is indexed to the consumer price index:
pLS,h,sg
p¯LS,h,sg
= (1− usg)
pL,sg
p¯L,sg
(1− tS,h − tI,h) + usg
pC,h
p¯C,h
b (59)
The unemployment rate is determined through a wage curve, which depends on
the coefficient of residual income progression. We assume that the tax rates of the
median household (h =M) are the relevant ones:
usg
u¯sg
=
1− t¯I,M
³
1− TAMY¯M
´
1− t¯I,M
1− tI,M
1− tI,M
³
1− TAMYM
´ (60)
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